ARIES Documents

Utility Advisory Committee Reports

INTRODUCTION

The meeting, which was convened by the Chairman of the Utility Advisory Committee, was in fact a combined meeting of that committee and of the EPRI Fusion Working Group. The list of attendees is given as Appendix I.

The meeting had two clearly-defined objectives: first, provide the combined committee membership with an up-date of the fusion program overall, the present status of the design of ITER, a detailed review of work in the Tokamak Fusion Power Plant Studies program including a comparison of the various designs that had been developed throughout the duration of the project, and a review of fusion safety issues. Second, broaden utility input to the power plant studies program through the much-expanded utility representation that was present at the meeting. This helped to refine further a paradigm that had been developed and reviewed following input received at earlier meetings. The meeting agenda is provided as Appendix II.

REVIEW OF PREVIOUS INTERACTION AND ADVICE

Dean Robert W. Conn reviewed the charge to the Fusion Power Plant Studies Program Utility Advisory Committee and summarized the progress that had been made during, and subsequently as a result of, each of the previous meetings.

The intent had been to develop a paradigm that would embody those beneficial elements of fusion that would result in the most persuasive case that a CEO or VP might present to the Board of Directors of an electric utility when requesting that they invest in fusion power plants. The elements of this paradigm are:

1. Cost advantage over other available central station options.
2. Licensing is easy.
3. No need for evacuation plan.
4. Produces no high-level waste.
5. Reliable, available, and stable as an electrical power source.
6. No local or global atmospheric impact.
7. Fuel cycle is closed on-site.
8. Fuel availability is high.
9. Capable of load following.
10. Available in a range of unit sizes.

In developing the paradigm, a number of fundamental assumptions had been made. Several of these issues were revisited during the discussion that ensued.

Optimum Size of Fusion Power Plant

An item that had been of concern related to the size of fusion power plant that would be of interest to a utility. However, the nature of future typical utilities as distributors or as plant owners/operators had been difficult to define, and the required size of base-load plants and the anticipated mix of energy sources had emerged as items that were to a large extent specific to a particular utility. Different utilities held widely differing viewpoints, and it had not been possible to arrive at consensus. The point was made, however, that while the actual size of a new plant may vary from utility to utility, the size selected by each utility was likely to result in an increment that was a few percent of its total grid availability: too much risk was involved in adding large increments of capacity. Hence, a broad a range of sizes will increase the potential customer base.

Cost Advantage Required of a Fusion Power Plant

At previous meetings, it had been stated that fusion must offer a clear cost advantage over other forms of central plant if it were to be accepted. It had been assumed that this advantage should be of the order of 10-to-20% or utilities would opt to stay with the lowest-cost incumbent technology because of a high comfort factor with it. The methodology by which the 10-to-20 percent figure had been arrived at was questioned. The point was made that while an advantage of 10-to-20 percent might be appropriate for relatively inexpensive plant, because of the vast number of dollars involved in a fusion plant, a much smaller cost advantage could be acceptable, A 20% cost advantage for plant costing $10 million would yield a savings of $2 million: A 2% cost advantage for plant costing $10 billion would yield a savings of $200 million. The magnitude of the commitment was important; the actual savings were the real concern, not just a percentage figure. It was agreed that fusion should show a "clear cost advantage" however it might be arrived at.

Cost of a DEMO Plant

The assumption had been made that the DEMO could be up to 20% more expensive than other power generating options provided that a pathway could be identified to a commercial system that would have a clear cost advantage. The numbers were challenged as being unrealistic, the consensus being that the increased cost prediction of 20% for DEMO was unnecessarily low. It was generally agreed that the cost prediction was too severe for a demonstration unit and that a softer approach should be used. The paradigm should not be viewed as a business plan; that should come later. The case for the Board of Directors should not contain a hard number and would still be satisfactory without one.

However, a contrary minority view that was consistent with sentiments expressed at earlier meetings persisted, the contention being that a business plan with firm numbers indicating an increased cost of not more than 20% would be required by a Board of Directors before approval was given to proceed with DEMO.

DEMO Construction Consortium

The cost assumption for the construction of DEMO was that the U.S. government would pay for part of the cost, and that the utilities and industry would pay the rest. While the advantage that would accrue to the utility that accepted the facility within its grid was clear, the advantages that would accrue to the other members of the consortium were questioned. The ability to influence design decisions through participation in the project was viewed as being important, but was overshadowed by the perceived advantage of ownership of the technology.

Licensing

As in previous meetings, the issue of licensing led to much discussion. The importance of avoidance of the requirement for the design-basis-accident was reviewed since such an accident would be innocuous for fusion, eliminating the need for an evacuation plan. The question of whether or not the word "licensing" should be used at all was debated, particularly with respect to ITER which could possibly be constructed on a DOE site. The desirability of using the word "permitting" instead was explored. It was pointed out that whereas the U.S.DOE itself regulates DOE facilities today, in five years time it might not. The use of materials, such as tritium, that result in the production of ionizing radiation is regulated by the NRC and is what requires licensing. There are 10,000 Curies of radioactivity in every gram of tritium. ITER will contain approximately 1 Kg of tritium. Hence regulation will definitely be necessary. Whereas the fusion community will not be able to argue for the dismissal of licensing issues, it could possibly bring favorable influence to bear upon the licensing process. This should be an important goal for the community.

Disposal of Waste Material

It was emphasized that whatever wastes are likely to be generated by the fusion process, one should make sure that regulations for their disposal exist before embarking on the design and construction of plant. The generation of mixed waste is highly undesirable since no one knows how to dispose of it. No agency has a policy, and regulations for mixed waste disposal do not exist. If mixed waste cannot be avoided, then it will be necessary to develop the regulations for its disposal.

Plant Shut-Down

An important advantage for fusion power plants emerged from the fact that a fusion power plant will only need to be shut down for regular maintenance (i.e. not for refueling). Such a plant will not require fuel shipments except that for first start-up and need never be shut down for re-fueling. In comparison, fission plants incur substantial downtime (45 or more days) at relatively frequent (18 month) intervals. Since a fusion plant will not need re-fueling, it could be operated continuously for five or more years. This is a feature that would fascinate the Board of Directors of a utility. It would, however, then be necessary to look at the maintenance characteristics of the balance of the plant. Turbines and their control valves, for example, need maintenance after 18 months-to-two years of operation. Thus there may be a need for duplication of peripheral equipment in order to take advantage of a fusion generator's long, continuous power production run. The duplication of peripheral equipment would be costly, but this disadvantage would be off-set if the operating span between successive shut-downs was long enough, if the blanket of the fusion generator could be replaced at reasonable cost, and if the overall fusion generating plant would last and operate for forty years or so. The plant duplication decision process would inevitably involve trade-offs between requirements as the optimum combination of desirable features was sought.

REVIEW OF EPRI FUSION WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES

Dr. Jack Kaslow, Chairman of the EPRI Fusion Working Group, described the activities of the group, which comprised twelve persons. He emphasized that the group possessed a great deal of utility experience but lacked fusion experience. The group had therefore needed educating in fusion technology, had liked what they had been exposed to, and were happy to have the fusion program continue. The group considered that the fusion program overall was well structured, and concurred that ITER was the next logical step towards fusion power. The EPRI Group see themselves as a resource to the fusion community that is able to describe the fusion power plants that utilities would have most interest in.

Fusion power plants must meet three principal criteria: economics, public acceptance, and licensing simplicity.

Economics

Economics was especially important and fusion plants must be less expensive than those based on competing technologies. However, it was the total life-cycle cost that was important rather than the cost of the initial plant.

Plant size and flexibility was also important. Fusion plants should be able to operate from the low hundreds of megawatts up to gigawatts, and fusion plants should have low acreage requirements. Construction should be simple and of short duration, the plant should be highly reliable, and should provide low fuel cycle costs. The power plant should offer high availability, and should require low numbers of operators to run it. It should certainly require no more operating sophistication than competitive plants.

Fusion plants should offer long operating life. End of life needs to be determined based upon engineering parameters rather than be dictated by some arbitrary accounting formula as is common with fission plants. When the life of a fusion plant is over, end-of-life costs should be minimized. Any additional distribution costs that might be due to fusion power generation must be understood and, better still, avoided.

Validation of performance at the pilot plant stage, to permit subsequent scale-up to commercial power plants, would be essential, thus to aid in building the case needed to finance the first-of-a-kind commercial unit.

Public Acceptance

The fusion community needs to educate the public in the advantages provided by fusion power. The environmental attractiveness and safety of the technology should be maximized, and lower power generating costs should be emphasized. Waste heat from fusion power plants should be minimized. The fusion community should monitor the growing conflict between environmentalists and free-market forces in electric power generation since the outcome could affect fusion plant design.

Safety is critically important. It is essential that the case made for fusion safety be credible. The building of this case should not be left to fusion experts: The public must be involved from the outset and it is essential that the early public experiences with fusion be positive. The use of existing terminology that has negative safety connotations not applicable or relevant to fusion must be avoided. The community's habit of drawing upon words from fission's lexicon must cease. The community should recognize that renewables might well be the benchmark against which fusion will be judged. Economics will influence public acceptance and the positive impact of fusion on U.S. global competitiveness should be emphasized.

Regulatory Simplicity

Regulations are based upon the need to protect the public. The level and severity of the regulations applied to fusion will be influenced by public acceptance of the technology. Plant and system design will also influence the regulations. There might be a minimum need for engineered safety features, waste generation might be minimized, and so on. The EPRI Fusion Working Group had not given rankings to desirable engineering features since the incorporation of each feature would involve a trade-off that would need very careful evaluation within the context of the final design.

FUSION ENERGY PROGRAM UPDATE

Dr. N. Anne Davies, Associate Director for Fusion Energy, briefed the committee on the U.S. fusion program and outlined the strategy that would be pursued up to the construction and operation of DEMO. The U.S. does not have a stand-alone fusion program today, and relies significantly upon the world-wide effort, to which it also contributes significantly.

ITER and DEMO

At present, no major fusion device is being planned between ITER and DEMO. While it is possible that DEMO could be an international project, currently each of the four parties is contemplating building its own DEMO. If DEMO should become an international project, then commercial interests and governmental and political issues will need to be dealt with, in addition to technological issues. The licensing issues would also be more complex. Hence the parties were still thinking of building DEMO's separately. ITER is being designed such that it can be regulated by every Party. However, the issue of decoupling ITER regulation issues from those of DEMO would be made easier in the U.S. if ITER were to be constructed overseas. The contrary view was expressed, viz. that wherever ITER was sited, U.S. regulators would sieze upon it as representing the best precedent upon which to base fusion plant regulations. It would therefore be better to construct ITER in the U.S. where the process could be influenced by U.S. power producers.*

The advisability of building more than one DEMO was explored. It was suggested that since a wide variety of new technologies would need to be incorporated into DEMO, a DEMO would be more expensive than ITER. The question was raised that if the World had elected to collaborate on the design and construction of ITER because of its high cost, then why would each of the parties elect to design and build its own more-expensive DEMO? A better approach would be for each party to construct its own ITER and then down-select technologies to complete one international DEMO. The answer was that DEMO's will be smaller than ITER, and less expensive. ITER is intended to undertake a great deal of experimental testing, and the added flexibility incorporated into the machine to facilitate this is adding to its cost. In addition, due to as-yet unresolved uncertainties in fusion technology, ITER is being conservatively designed to compensate.

DEMO is intended to generate electrical power. As part of the DEMO program, therefore, issues concerning the balance-of-plant will have to be dealt with. The question of whether such plant would be experimental was raised. It was thought that some of the plant would be conventional in nature, and that ITER would have eliminated certain of the remaining uncertainties. However, if one was perhaps prepared to accept some loss in generating efficiency by operating a fusion plant at conventional temperatures, then regular balance-of-plant could be used.

The issue of sharing and transfer of technology was raised, concern being expressed that the party that provided the site for ITER would gain a technological advantage over the others. It was not clear exactly what advantages, if any, the host nation might expect, As a result. the U.S. was undertaking a detailed review of the matter.

Congressional Activity

The Johnston Bill, the "International Fusion Energy Act of 1993", stipulates that the U.S. fusion program should focus on ITER and DEMO, that the U.S. must establish the Office of ITER Negotiator, and that the DOE select a U.S. candidate site for ITER. If ITER activities were to cease, then the U.S. fusion program would be reduced to $50 million per year.

House Science, Space and Technology Committee Chairman Brown's Fusion Bill, the "Fusion Energy Authorization Act of 1994", contains major ITER provisions and calls for an accelerated commitment to U.S. participation in ITER, for selection of the host country for siting of the facility by October 1995 and, if the U.S. is to host, for selection of the U.S. site by June 1996. The bill calls for a substantial U.S. industry and utility role in ITER. It also supports research on alternative fusion concepts, with authorized funding of $380 million in FY95, including $26 million for alternative concepts, increasing to $475 million in FY97 with $31 million for alternative concepts.

In this respect, EPRI's support of deuterated metals (cold fusion) research was of interest. It was explained that this interest arose solely out of curiosity. The members of EPRI do not think that fusion is taking place, but would like to find out exactly what is occurring. Hence the organization is supporting a modest program of research in the field.

ITER DESIGN UPDATE

Dr. Charles C. Baker, U.S. ITER Home Team Leader, summarized the history and organizational set-up of the ITER project, the objective of which is to demonstrate the scientific and technological feasibility of fusion as a power source. In particular, ITER will demonstrate controlled ignition and plasma burn, will demonstrate the suitability of technologies essential to fusion power generators, and will perform integrated testing of high heat-flux and nuclear components. Steady-state operation on ITER is also a goal.

The ITER program can be modified, but not unilaterally. A credit system has been established to control the project, within which design tasks, development tasks and research tasks are undertaken. The various tasks are described in documents which each of the Parties must adhere to and deliver against.

The need for each party to design and construct its own DEMO arose because of international disagreement over what it should be and how it should operate. Hence, a single demonstration power unit constructed as an international project might be unsuitable to the U.S. It was thus better for each of the Parties to develop its own DEMO. Further, the other three Parties have different time-frames to that of the U.S. for commercialization of fusion technology. Some consider that the ITER mission should not be burdened with DEMO or first-of-a-kind fusion plant requirements at all. Their viewpoint is that no one really knows how well fusion power generation is likely to work, that it would be better to prove feasibility first, and then proceed to commercialization. Elsewhere within the Parties there is less pressure than in the U.S. to complete the project quickly, due to the different political and economic climates that exist. The U.S. fusion community has the problem of rationalizing the fusion program in the U.S.A. to obtain continuing funding for it. The ITER Technical Objectives Chart, shown in Table 1, represents a compromise reached between the four Parties.

Reliability issues need to be explored since no tokamak capable of extended operation has ever been constructed. ITER will be the first, and the provision of the capability to operate continuously for three-to-six days will be used to provide answers to reliability concerns. Materials and components that are known to be reliable in conventional environments might not be so when used inside a tokamak. Such components will be exposed to the plasma, to high temperature, to neutron bombardment, and to high magnetic fields, simultaneously.

• Operating mode:-controlled ignition at extended burns (steady-state as an ultimate goal)
• Pulse length-1000 seconds (flat top)
• Average neutron-about 1 MW/m²wall loading
• Neutron fluence-at least 1 MW a/m² -up to 3 MW a/m²
• Auxiliary heating-achieve ignition system(non-inductive current drive capability)
• Continuous testing-three to six day periods

Given the present physics state-of-the-art on non-inductive current drive in tokamaks, the amount of current-drive electrical power needed to drive the full plasma current in ITER would be prohibitively large. Therefore, current-drive scenarios in ITER must assume improved physics (as might be demonstrated in TPX) and/or operation at reduced levels of plasma current.

The parameters to which ITER is being designed are given in Table 2.

	Major radius	        -	8.10 m
	Minor radius	        -	3.00 m
	Plasma elongation	-	1.55
	Toroidal magnetic field	-	5.7 T (on axis)
	Plasma current	        -	24 MA
	Nominal fusion power	-	1500 MW
	Pulse repetition cycle	-	2200 sec
	Auxiliary heating power	-	50 MW

ITER is large and costly. Commercial power producing tokamaks will be smaller and less expensive, unless the licensing process is hostile. A hostile licensing environment will drive up the cost of fusion plant and adversely affect economics. ITER will be constructed from steel, and should be subject to one set of regulations. Subsequent tokamaks will be made from low-activation materials and should therefore be subject to a less severe set of requirements.

ITER will use superconducting magnets, operated at 4.2^oK. Much care is being expended in the design of the blanket and shield to ensure that these components can be readily maintained and replaced.

Although the official site requirements for ITER have not yet been released, Table 3 lists what some of the parameters are likely to be.

*	Land area	                 ~ 100 acres
*	Electrical reactive power	 1000 MVA (nominal)
*	Thermal cooling	                 ~ 2000 MW
*	Exclusion radius	         ~ 1 km
*	Transportation	                 Barge access

Cooling water will be an issue, but electrical power requirements will pose an even bigger problem which arises due to ITER's intermittent mode of operation. The problem will not exist with a commercial power plant since commercial plants will operate continuously. If a site for ITER is to be selected in the U.S., the fusion program will probably first look at DOE sites, and then federal sites, before considering "green field" sites.

FUSION PLANT CONCEPTUAL DESIGN

Mr. Steve Rosen summed up initial reactions to the presentations on behalf of the committee members. A leap in technological development is still required before a fusion plant will generate electricity. A much larger gulf exists between ITER and the first commercial power plant than had originally been thought. Under the circumstances, one should not try to design ITER to be as close as possible to the first-of-a-kind commercial generator.

The siting of ITER gave rise to concerns, in particular because of the large power requirements. The sheer size of ITER, and the tremendous forces that its operation would involve, were also of concern. The issue of remote handling, including weld cutting, re-welding and inspection, will lead via regulation to remote inspection as well, and would give rise to significant maintenance and inspection problems. Finally, industrial safety aspects and nuclear safety aspects are both of major importance and need much more attention.

OVERVIEW OF ARIES AND PULSAR TOKAMAK FUSION PLANT STUDIES

Dr. Farrokh Najmabadi presented a summary of the ARIES and PULSAR studies, and started by contrasting the ease of access and maintenance envisioned for commercial power plants with the relatively difficult situation that would face ITER. The safety of commercial plant would also be enhanced to the point where the first indication of the most damaging accident, that involving total loss of coolant, would be shut-down of the fusion reaction itself. Very little impurity is needed in the plasma to stop the reaction. In fact, a totally passive engineering concept could be incorporated in the tokamak to control the temperature at which the reaction is extinguished through use of a coupon of material that would volatilize at the desired temperature.

The objectives of the PULSAR program are to study the feasibility and potential features of a tokamak fusion power plant that would utilize a pulsed mode of plasma operation yet provide steady electrical output. Pulsed plasma operation involves the resolution of many critical issues, including those of large and expensive power supplies for the PF system, thermal energy storage, reliable magnet design to combat cyclic fatigue and rapid PF ramp rates, fatigue in the first wall, blanket, shield and divertor, and reliability of complex components under cyclic operation. The operating cycle is summarized in a PULSAR event line. During the plasma burn, coolant passes through the blanket and the shield heats up. During the dwell in-between pulses, the coolant passes through the shield. The change of temperature within the blanket is relatively small, whereas the shield cycles over a 300^oC range. The blanket absorbs approximately 95% of the neutrons generated by the reaction; the shield absorbs approximately 5%. It is the heat that is built up in the shield that maintains the electrical power output during the dwell time. The net result is steady electrical output from the fusion generator. Although a dwell time of thirty seconds would be preferred, such a short dwell is not practical, a dwell time of about three minutes being minimum.

The reliability of the start up after a dwell must be improved. Current experience projects one failure in every 300 attempts to start the reaction. This must improve to 1 in 3000 in order to meet the utilities' goal of no more than one failure to start up per year. Such an improvement can be achieved, but at a price, by building in redundancy, adding sensors and employing sophisticated automatic controls. The alternative of utilizing day-long pulses has also been investigated, in which case one failure in 300 would equate roughly to one failure to start per year. However, the cost of such a system would be almost twice that of the proposed advanced steady-state machines. But, if advanced steady-state machines do not meet expectations and cannot be operated at high bootstrap fraction, thus requiring significant external power to keep them operating, their costs would be increased considerably and pulsed machines might become economically attractive.

When a fission unit trips out of service for whatever reason, it takes a long time to get it back on line due to the plethora of mandatory safety checks that must be carried out. Hence it is essential that fusion units not have to conform to the same regulations as fission plant. There is absolutely no need to undertake a series of extensive safety checks simply due to the inability of a pulsed fusion plant to-refire.

FUSION SAFETY

Dr. Glen R. Longhurst, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, presented a review of fusion safety-standard development activities. A task to develop a Fusion Safety Standard has been initiated by DOE at INEL with input from other institutions. The development is being overseen by a multi-agency steering committee, the objective being to produce a self-sufficient guide to achieving safety in fusion facilities while avoiding unnecessary encumbrances from fission. The program should result in a document that will be useful for ITER.

The steering committee presently comprises persons who each have a vested interest in fusion. It was suggested that committee membership be broadened to include potential future adversaries and to include such persons in consensus decisions.

Of major concern is an accident involving destruction of a fusion plant. Here, the effect of radioactivity is paramount. Radiation is not the only hazard, but it is the one that dominates public perception. For example, the perceived risk from fission is over 1000 times the actual risk! Radioactive material, for example tritium or neutron-induced activation products in structural materials, may be released from a fusion power plant in an accident. A measure of the consequence of an accident in a fusion plant is the dose received by someone at the site boundary or by someone working at the plant itself.

Waste issues are also important but are more difficult to quantify. Different measures need to be taken when disposing of different kinds of waste. Non-hazardous wastes require mainly space for disposal. Low-level wastes may be disposed of by shallow land burial. High-level wastes require deep geological burial. One measure of waste significance, the waste disposal rating, is the amount of mixing with threshold level material needed to reduce a waste hazard to acceptable levels.

The original direction taken in the task to develop a fusion safety standard was towards the generation of a stand-alone DOE Order. But a review of existing Rules, Orders, and Standards indicated that a different direction was more appropriate. The requirements in existing directives need clarification and a risk-based approach. Experience indicates that the approval time for an Order would be too long to permit timely application to ITER. The approach to fusion safety guidance that was selected therefore involves the development of a Limited Technical Standard, since such should be achieved in a less difficult and more timely manner than an Order, will provide greater flexibility than an Order, yet ultimately could lead to the development of an Order. The guidance that will be provided by the Limited Technical Standard will ensure a high level of safety of fusion test facilities for workers, the public, and the environment.

The process for preparing a standard is non-trivial. It involves a review of existing requirements, a determination of the need for additional requirements, and a formulation of the manner in which to implement a graded approach to risk that employs Probability Safety Analysis (PSA). The ten top-ranked risks or so are important and must be taken into account while developing the Standard. Taking account of the remaining risks will add little or nothing to safety; they should not be included. Many things have safety or risk implications but some risks are so small that they must be ignored. There is a threshold below which the risk should be ignored, and above which it is necessary to undertake a PSA.

The expectation is that an Environmental Impact Statement will be required if the U.S. government is involved in the construction of ITER, even if ITER is constructed outside of the U.S.

UTILITY'S FUSION PLANT PLANNING PROCESS

A review of projected demand versus capacity indicates when additional capacity will be required by the utility. A review of the available options will determine what type of capacity will be added. Eventually, fusion will be one of those options. The utility will establish a task force that will undertake a thorough analysis of a fusion plant. At the outset, the task force will compile a list of questions that must be answered before a case to add a fusion plant can be made, These include a site review and the determination of the layout of the major components. Plant arrangement, transmission corridors, maintenance access, cranes, rail/barge access, roads, the availability of cooling water, land requirements and environmental impact are all important factors. Next, the task force will undertake a systems review. The task force will need to understand the design philosophy; it is important to know how the design evolved and why it is configured the way it is, to obtain a description of the major system features, and to follow the historical evolution of specific issues. Design basis documentation will be needed early on in the process.

A review of the system level design basis is also most important; this will include the process flow diagram with its flows, pressures and temperatures, and the system logic diagrams with its interlocks and permissives. Safety functions, normal operating functions, performance requirements, regulatory requirements and guidance, and system interfaces will all receive scrutiny.

A component level design basis review will be undertaken in great detail. The design, type and frequency of usage of components are all important. Finally, the licensing process will be studied; it is important to know what regulatory commitments have been made. The safety sequence analysis is most important. It is what drives the questions, all of which relate to technical issues.

Before even getting to the technical, regulatory, operational and system planning issues discussed above, a utility will already have investigated in detail, and dealt with, the management, financial, and legal issues involved.

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

Concern was expressed over the future availability of personnel with appropriate skills to operate fusion plants, both at the engineering level and at the maintenance level. Even though the universities are educating but a small number of persons in fusion at present, nevertheless these are still too many for the on-going fusion program to absorb, and many valuable persons are being lost to fusion and are finding employment in other fields. There will therefore be an acute shortage of trained personnel unless this matter is addressed. Increased education in fusion needs to be incorporated in the forward strategic plan for fusion.

NEXT MEETING

The following topics, presented by experts from within the fusion program, will be included for discussion at the next meeting:

• The essential characteristics of DEMO.
• The site characteristics for a fusion power plant.
• The detailed temporal power requirements for ITER.
• Issues of remote handling, remote welding and remote inspection of a fusion power plant.
• Previous experiences with "novel" electricity generating plant (presented by Dr. Lawrence Papay).

It was suggested that the committee consider continuing with meetings extending over a day-and-a-half, and that the meetings be held alternately at East Coast and West Coast sites. It was agreed that high-level representation from DOE be present at each meeting to provide members with political and program management up-dates.

Appendix I: Meeting Attendees

Name,                 Affiliation,                 Telephone Number
Steve Rosen, Chair      Houston Lighting and Power      512/972-7138
Charles Baker           ITER-UC San Diego               619/534-6207
Merwin Brown            PG&E                            510/866-5560
Troy Carter             General Atomics (student)       619/455-4157
Bob Conn                UC San Diego                    619/534-6237
Anne Davies             DOE/OFE                         301/903-4941
Terry Davies            ITER-UCLA/UC San Diego          619/534-9830
William Dove            DOE/OFE                         301/903-4598
Davis Ehst              Argonne National Laboratory     708/252-4829
Bill Ellis              Raytheon Engr. and Constr.      212/839-3398
Chris Hamilton		General Atomics			619/455-3364
Steve Herring		INEL				208/526-9497
Jack Kaslow		EPRI				603/894-6345
Glen Longhurst		INEL				208/526-9950
John McCann		Consolidated Edison of New York	914/734-5159
Dan Mears		Technology Insights		619/455-9080
Bill Muston		Texas Utilities			214/812-8407
Farrokh Najmabadi	UCLA/UC San Diego		310/825-5435
David Overskei		General Atomics			619/455-2490
Larry Papay		Bechtel	                        415/768-0275
Marshall Rosenbluth	UC San Diego			619/534-3790
Glenn T. Sager		General Atomics			619/455-2543
Tom Schneider		EPRI				415/855-2402
Pete Skrgic		Allegheny Power System		212/836-4320
Bruce A. Snow		Rochester Gas and Electric	716/724-8058
Mark Tillack		UCLA/UC San Diego		310/206-1230
Clement Wong		General Atomics			619/455-4258

Appendix II: Agenda

	June 22, 1994

1:00 PM	    Welcome	                        Robert W. Conn, UC San Diego
	    a)	Review of FPPSUAC Work	        Robert W. Conn, UC San Diego
	    b)	Review of EPRI Fusion Working	Jack Kaslow, EPRI Group Work

3:15 PM	    Fusion Update	                Anne Davies, DOE/OFE

4:30 PM	    ITER Design Update	                Charlie Baker, ITER HT


	June 23, 1994

9:00 AM	    Fusion Plant Conceptual Design	Steve Rosen, HL&P

10:15 AM    Overview of ARIES and PULSAR	Farrokh Najmabadi,
	    Tokamak Fusion Plant Studies	UCLA/UC San Diego

11:30 AM    Conceptual Commercial Plant	ARIES Team
	    Layout and Key Systems Descriptions

1:30 PM	    Definitions and Operating	        FPPSUAC
	    Criteria for the DEMO

2:30 PM     Fusion Safety			Glen Longhurst, INEL

3:30 PM	    Discussion and Future Plans

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